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Abstract 
Explanations of former South African President Thabo Mbeki’s public 
and private views on the aetiology of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the country 
remain partial at best without the recognition that the latter presuppose and 
imply a postmodernist/postcolonialist philosophy of science that erases the 
line separating the political from the scientific. Evidence from Mbeki’s public 
speeches, interviews, and private and anonymous writings suggests that it was 
postmodernist/postcolonialist theory that inspired him to doubt the “Western” 
scientific consensus on HIV/AIDS and to implement a public health policy 
that dragged its feet on full roll-out of antiretroviral therapy, causing thou-
sands of avoidable deaths. A weak reductio ad absurdum allows us to 
conclude from this premise that postmodernist/postcolonial critique of “Wes-
tern” science ought to be shunned. A comparative argument from conse-
quences further suggests that in a situation where a misguided health policy 
has lead to a humanitarian catastrophe, and where postmodernist/postcolonia-
list critique of science can and has been used to justify this policy, an alterna-
tive theory ought to be preferred on which such justification would not be pos-
sible. The paper closes with a call for a non-relativist alternative to postmo-
dernist/postcolonialist philosophy of science, and evaluates the potential of 
recent developments in ‘Studies of Expertise” to yield such.  
1. Introduction: the “South African HIV/AIDS Mystery”  1
South Africa is not the largest country in the world by population, by far. 
Yet in 2008 it was the country with the greatest number of people dying of 
HIV/AIDS, as well as the country with the greatest number of people living 
with it (310000 and 5.2 million, respectively).  Other countries with compa2 -
rable socio-economic development, GDP, and median income, such as Mexico 
and Brazil, posted much better numbers in the same period; African countries 
with significantly smaller health budgets, such as Uganda and Senegal, have 
also done better;  and many African countries with comparable infection sta3 -
tistics, such as Swaziland, do not have comparable health budgets. Developed 
countries, finally, have succeeded to a much greater degree at controlling the 
epidemic and have reduced death and infection rates to comparatively small 
percentages. It is therefore fair to speak of a South African HIV/AIDS conun-
drum: the catastrophic dimensions of the epidemic here require explanation. 
The conundrum deepens to a mystery when we consider the reaction to 
the epidemic of the South African government. Under President Thabo Mbeki 
(1999-2008), the government: 
• made antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) freely available to HIV positive 
South Africans only in 2004, many years after poorer African coun-
tries did so, such as e.g. Namibia 
• claimed that ARVs were toxic and that their efficacy was unproven 
• restricted the use of freely donated nevirapine4 (an ARV drug) 
• obstructed the access of South African entities to Global Fund to 
Fight AIDS grants (to buy ARVs)  (Chigwedere, Seage et al. 2008: 
p. 410) 
Furthermore, Mbeki in confidential letters and anonymously authored docu-
ments  claimed that:  4
 I take this expression from the title of (Epstein 2000) and the subtitle of (Cullinan 1
and Thom 2009). 
 See (UNAIDS 2010: p. 185) and (HSRC 2009: p. 3); these numbers have improved 2
somewhat in the latest official statistics.
 See e.g. references in (Nicoll and Killewo 2000).3
 Principally, (Castro Hlongwane  2002) and (Ramatlhodi 2001); for background in4 -
formation on these see footnotes nº 6 and nº 10. 
• Western drug companies, governments, and scientists endorse the 
so-called ‘consensus view’ that AIDS is caused by HIV merely to 
promote the sale of ARVs in a political-commercial campaign for 
money and power (Castro Hlongwane  2002: Chapters II, XV, and 
passim) 
• the “Western” scientific explanation of the high incidence of HIV 
infection in South Africa peddles centuries-old white racist beliefs 
that depict Africans as congenitally promiscuous and sexually rapa-
cious (op.cit., Preface; also (Ramatlhodi 2001)). 
• the scientific consensus view on HIV/AIDS ‘is based on these racist 
beliefs and concepts, [and] makes a powerful contribution to the fur-
ther entrenchment and popularisation of racism’ and the dehumani-
sation of black people (Castro Hlongwane  2002: Chapter I).   
Finally, Mbeki stated publicly that: 
• HIV is but one of the causes of AIDS in Africa, if it is a cause at all; 
other, more important, causes are poverty, malnutrition, and other 
African diseases that pre-date AIDS, such as tuberculosis. E.g. 
(Mbeki 2000a); (Harvey 2000) 
• a more comprehensive and adequate treatment response to AIDS in 
South Africa is therefore to fight poverty and malnutrition. (Mbeki 
2000a) 
An independent epidemiological study has estimated, conservatively, that as a 
result of the South African government’s health policy 330000–343000 adult 
South Africans died preventable deaths in 2000-2005 (Chigwedere, Seage et 
al. 2008); see also (Nattrass 2008). 
In Section 2 of this paper I shall argue that despite a deluge of research 
on this tragedy by scientists from multiple disciplines spanning the social and 
health sciences, Mbeki’s public pronouncements on HIV/AIDS and his official 
health policy cannot be fully understood without taking due account of their 
philosophical underpinnings. I claim that Mbeki’s explicitly stated views on 
the subject in fact presuppose and promulgate a recognisably postmodernist/
postcolonialist conception of science, corroborating this claim with excerpts 
from Mbeki’s speeches and interviews, as well as privately and anonymously 
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authored writings. Section 3 then draws a philosophical lesson from this in the 
form of two arguments, one a weak reductio ad absurdum, the other a compa-
rative argument from consequences, to the effect that postmodernist/postcolo-
nialist philosophy of science ought to be rejected, in favour of an alternative 
theory of science not susceptible to these arguments. The paper concludes with 
a brief and sceptical outlook on the potential of contemporary ‘Studies of Ex-
pertise’ to yield such an alternative. 
2. Mbeki hermeneutics 
The South African government’s baffling position on HIV/AIDS—it is 
the only government in the world to at least temporarily have flirted with so-
called ‘AIDS denialism’, the view that AIDS is not caused by HIV—in 
conjunction with the public health debacle in the country has prompted a large 
volume of research in multiple disciplines, including epidemiology, virology, 
political science, anthropology, sociology, economics, and history, as well as 
books by political activists, Mbeki biographers, and retired constitutional court 
justices.  I shall not discuss the merits of this work here, but merely note that 5
among the plethora of accounts, we can discern three different types of expla-
nation of the government’s stance: 
• political/institutional as exemplified by (Butler 2005), (Lodge 
2002); (Fourie and Meyer 2010); (Kauffman 2004); (Sheckels 
2004); (Myburgh 2009); (Mulwo, Tomaselli et al. 2012) 
• biographical/psychological (Kenyon 2009); (Gevisser 2007); 
(Gumede 2007) 
• social/anthropological (Fassin 2007), (Phillips 2004), (Mbali 
2004), (Youde 2005) 
 See e.g. (Schneider and Fassin 2002); (Lodge 2002); (Mbali 2003, 2004); (Nattrass 5
2003, Nattrass 2007, 2008); (Sitze 2004); (Schuklenk 2004); (Kauffman 2004); (van 
der Vliet 1004); (Sheckels 2004); (Mosley 2004); (Butler 2005); (Youde 2005); 
(Cameron 2005); (Gevisser 2007); (Epstein 2007); (Gumede 2007); (Thornton 2008); 
(Chigwedere, Seage et al. 2008); (Kenyon 2009); (Kalichman 2009); (Cullinan and 
Thom 2009); (Chigwedere and Essex 2010); (Geffen 2010); (Fourie and Meyer 
2010); (Mulwo, Tomaselli et al. 2012). This list is selective.
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These partially overlap, and the typology like most typologies is somewhat 
artificial. Yet, tellingly despite their different approaches each of the above 
authors accepts the necessity to answer to a basic question: were Mbeki’s crit-
ics and political opponents correct to characterise his stance on AIDS as ‘irra-
tional’, ‘incompetent’, ‘marginal’, ‘paranoid’, or ‘bad, even evil’? (Dugger 
2008); or could Mbeki, despite being factually wrong about the viral aetiology 
of AIDS, nevertheless be credited with uncovering an important truth that has 
the potential to partially or even fully justify his actions?   
(Fassin 2007) typifies the social/anthropological answer to this question. 
He laments that ‘the intellectual landscape of the AIDS epidemic has been re-
duced to simple terms’—on the one side, there is good sense and truth, medi-
cine and science, and people of goodwill, on the other, there is incompetence 
and error, corrupt politicians and quack scientists—and that any sociologist or 
anthropologist who wants to explore things further ‘will be exposed to the 
doubly disqualifying accusation of denialist relativism and criminal irrespon-
sibility’ (op. cit.: p. 76). This damagingly simplistic dichotomy makes it hard 
to understand how a head of state who, by most accounts, is intelligent and 
honest, could have taken the “wrong” side; and even harder to understand why 
his views were, at the time at least, well received by large segments of the 
South African public (ibid.). Fassin cites (Lloyd 1990) and (Said 1978, 2003) 
to decry ’the hasty diagnostics of irrationality’, in other words the tendency of 
Western scholars to scientifically “explain” as irrational those representations 
or acts by the non-Western ‘Other’ that they deem reprehensible or illegitimate 
(op. cit.: p. 77).  
To avoid prejudice toward the Other as well as the nefarious “Western” 
assumption of a neat rational/irrational divide, ‘a different reading of history 
and a different conception of politics’ is necessary, says Fassin, a conception 
based on a ‘historiography-informed ethnography’ that includes an analysis of 
the ideological structure of the South African body politic, the colonial and 
Apartheid history of South Africa, Mbeki’s personal experience, and the expe-
rience of black South Africans in the struggle against Apartheid generally 
(op.cit.: pp. xiv, 16ff). After all, South Africa has a long and deplorable track 
record of medical science being abused to justify oppressive interventions by 
white governments; and “Western” science, generally, a long history of giving 
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legitimacy to some of the most deeply prejudiced theories about race. Fassin 
thus recommends a sociological interpretation of Mbeki’s thinking on which 
the latter exhibits a ‘particular rationality’, an interpretation that would ’make 
biological and social theories of HIV/AIDS compatible with each other' (op.-
cit.: p: 15; my emphasis). For Fassin, Mbeki’s politics and his social assump-
tions may have been quite correct; even though he may have been ‘giving the 
wrong answers’, he was ‘asking the right questions’ (op.cit: p. 99ff). 
One of the central contentions of a private letter of 2001 by Mbeki to 
Malegapuru Makgoba is precisely that he (Mbeki) was justified to view the 
“Western” consensus on HIV/AIDS with suspicion, and to refuse to ‘leave 
science to the [western] scientists’.  Mbeki attempts to persuade Makgoba—6
who had been critical of the government’s health policy—of his position on 
HIV/AIDS, and suggests that those who oppose him by asking the question  
[…] what right does a non-scientist have, such as our President, to 
question matters that science in Britain, France, Portugal and the Unit-
ed States settled many years ago? (Ramatlhodi 2001: p. 4) 
are in fact asking the question 
[…] what right does any African have to question the findings of west-
ern science, regardless of whether or not he or she is a scientist or not! 
(ibid.; emphasis mine). 
Mbeki enjoins Makgoba to join him in his fight ‘against our slavish sub-
servience to western science’ (op. cit.: p. 5), and draws an analogy between the 
forced removal in 1901 of black Africans from Cape Town's District Six—on 
grounds of unsubstantiated claims that Africans disproportionately are carriers 
of the bubonic plague—and the HIV/AIDS hypothesis, according to which 
 See (Ramatlhodi 2001). Professor Makgoba is a regarded immunologist who was 6
President of the South African Medical Research Council at the time. The confiden-
tial letter, made public in (Dugger 2008), nominally is authored by Ngoako Ramatl-
hodi, Premier of the Limpopo Provincial Government during Mbeki’s term (currently 
Minister of Mineral Resources). Yet Ramatlhodi was ’one of Mbeki’s closest allies 
and his former speechwriter, and he often set out controversial views held by the 
president, but which he could not publicly express himself’ (Gumede 2007: p. 330). 
Ramatlhodi himself has acknowledged that “his” 2001 letter to Makgoba was ‘drafted 
by Mr. Mbeki’s Office’  (Dugger 2008: p. A1). As in the case of (Castro Hlongwane 
2002) there is little doubt that (Ramatlhodi 2001) accurately represents Mbeki’s 
views on the science of HIV/AIDS.
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’once again, we the Natives are accused of being the biggest global threat to 
human life’ (op. cit.: p. 11). 
My aim here is neither to confirm nor to refute Fassin’s social/anthropo-
logical or any of the other explanations of Mbeki’s denialism in the literature; 
nor is it to attempt to supplant them with an explanation of my own, by unco-
vering, say, new facts about Mbeki’s thought processes and the factors that 
influenced him; nor is it, of course, to refight the scientific battle against AIDS 
denialism, which long ago has been comprehensively won by medical 
science.  It is, instead, to try to understand Mbeki’s public pronouncements as 7
well as his anonymous and private writings on the subject from the point of 
view of their most plausible philosophical underpinnings, in order to extract a 
philosophical argument from this episode of South African history. It turns out 
that many of Mbeki’s pronouncements on the subject of HIV/AIDS and public 
health policy presuppose and imply a distinctly postmodernist/postcolonialist 
conception of science, as I will contend presently. 
A few lexical comments are in order before we proceed, for the expres-
sion ‘postmodernist/postcolonialist’ needs elucidation. ‘Postmodernism’ and 
‘postcolonialism’ are both elusive terms referring to a nebula of theories, prac-
tices and claims, and are difficult to define on their own, let alone in their rela-
tionship to each other. Postmodernism, we might say somewhat stipulatively, 
is characterised by a concern with: challenging the allegedly ‘apodictic’ or 
‘hegemonic’ discourse of the modern age through adoption of an ‘anti-syste-
mic’ mode of understanding that emphasises a plurality of perspectives and 
interfaces; with unravelling ‘metanarratives’ such as that of “scientific univer-
salism” or European Enlightenment rationality; and with attacking overly eco-
nomistic ways of interpreting social reality and culture. Postcolonialism on the 
other hand, is a critical practice concerned with the historical discourse and 
ideology of colonialism and European imperialism, as well as with the mate-
rial, psychological and cultural effects on those subjugated to it; see (Quayson 
2000: pp. 90-96). Insofar as postcolonialism ‘bears witness to the unequal and 
uneven forces of cultural representation involved in the contest for political 
 See e.g. (Cohen 1994); (O'Brien and Goedert 1996); (Chigwedere and Essex 2010); 7
("The Durban Declaration"  2000). Mbeki, by all appearances, mistook a risk factor 
(poverty) for a causative agent, see (Mosley 2004). For more on the aetiology of 
AIDS, see e.g. references nº 3-7 of ("The Durban Declaration"  2000).
!7
and social authority within the modern world order’ (Bhabha 1992), cited in 
(Quayson 2000: p. 94), it shares postmodernism’s anti-systemic posture, and 
its desire to challenge the authority of hegemonic systems of representation 
that validate institutional subordination and silence marginal voices and expe-
riences. Quayson, for one, thinks that postmodernism cannot explain the 
contemporary world without first becoming postcolonial, and vice versa (op. 
cit.: 106). While useful, these are very broad strokes, however. In Section 4 I 
shall adopt a much more circumscribed meaning for the term ‘postmodernist/
postcolonialist’ as applied specifically to the philosophy of science.   
To show the postmodern/postcolonial soil from which Mbeki’s pronoun-
cements on science germinated, let’s begin with his explicit view of science as 
political, pluralistic, and democratic. In a 2000 interview on the TV pro-
gramme Carte Blanche, for example, Mbeki explains why he convened an 
Presidential Advisory Panel on HIV/AIDS composed in equal parts of repre-
sentatives of the consensus position and of AIDS denialists, by stating that 
scientists must never suppress the voices of the minority.  Science—like a plu8 -
ralist democracy—must give everyone an equal right to be heard and, most of 
all, avoid being influenced by just one ‘school of thought’: 
‘I get the sense […] that we've all of us been educated into one school 
of thought, and really I am not surprised at all that you would find, I'm 
quite sure an overwhelming majority of scientists in this field, in this 
culture, people would hold a particular point of view because that is all 
they were exposed to. This other point of view which is I think part of 
what is frightening, this alternative point of view, in a sense has been 
blacked out. It must not be heard, must not be seen, that’s the demand 
now. Why is Thabo Mbeki talking to discredited scientists, giving 
them legitimacy. It's very worrying at this time in the world that any 
point of view should be prohibited, that's banned, there are heretics 
that should be burned at the stake. And it's all said in the name of sci-
ence and health. It can't be right. (Mbeki 2000c) 
(Jones 2002) comments that ‘[i]n presenting this as an issue concerning “free-
dom of thought and speech,” Mbeki reveals that he sees Dissidents and Loyal-
 Denialist scientists with genuine HIV/AIDS expertise probably never numbered 8
more than a few dozen, while the 2000 Durban Declaration in support of the consen-
sus position published in the journal Nature was signed by more than 5000 practising 
HIV/AIDS scientists. 
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ists [adherents to the consensus view] as being on an equal epistemic 
level.’ (op. cit.: p. 512). After all, suppression of the dissident position in pub-
lic discourse could only be unjust if that position had as much epistemic right 
to be considered as the dominant position. It seems as if ‘[t]here is nothing 
epistemically special, Mbeki thinks, about a scientific position being domi-
nant. It is merely accepted by more scientists’ (op. cit.: p. 513).  
In (Castro Hlongwane  2002), Mbeki alleges that the global scientific 
consensus established 20 years ago that HIV causes AIDS  
[…] was frozen at this particular moment into an unquestionable and 
unchangeable monument to scientific thought. Accordingly, further 
scientific inquiry into this matter is impermissible. Such scientific 
knowledge as was possible two decades ago must be supported by all 
and sundry, including scientists, as part of a religious dogma. (Castro 
Hlongwane  2002: Ch. I).  9
In (Ramatlhodi 2001), Mbeki notes that ’almost by definition, new scientific 
truths are a repudiation of popular and generally accepted views, which makes 
scientific originality inherently an act of scientific rebellion’, and suggests that 
their defenders must be protected. The ‘rebels’ and ‘heretics’ Mbeki is think-
ing of clearly are the AIDS denialists on his Advisory Panel (principally, Pro-
fessor Peter Duesberg and Dr. David Rasnick). Mbeki describes his rationale 
for the Panel in these terms:  
[Interviewer]: ‘Some AIDS doctors say the evidence is overwhelming 
that AIDS exists and AZT [an early ARV drug] is of benefit. What is 
your comment on that?’ 
Thabo Mbeki: ’I say that why don't we bring all points of view. Sit 
around a table and discuss this evidence, and produce evidence as it 
 (Castro Hlongwane  2002), full title ‘Castro Hlongwane, Caravans, Cats, Geese, 9
Foot & Mouth and Statistics: HIV/AIDS and the Struggle for the Humanisation of the 
African’, is an anonymously authored discussion document distributed at the March 
2002 National Executive Council meeting of the governing African National Con-
gress (ANC). It was widely accepted at the time of its circulation to be President 
Mbeki’s own work (an attributed co-author is Peter Mokaba; for discussion, see e.g. 
(Gevisser 2007: pp. 736ff)). There is consensus in the literature that it represents 
President Mbeki’s considered position on HIV/AIDS, and that the latter is indeed 
“denialist.” For a detailed defence of the view that Mbeki’s health policy is at-
tributable to his 'belief that several key tenets of science around AIDS are racist’ and 
that ‘denialism [is] a defence of Africans against racism and neo-imperialism,’ see 
(Mbali 2004); also (Mulwo, Tomaselli et al. 2012). 
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may be, and let's see what the outcome is, which is why we are having 
this International panel which we are all talking about. They may very 
well be correct, but I think if they are correct and they are convinced 
they are correct, it would be a good thing to demonstrate to those who 
are wrong, that they are wrong.’ (Mbeki 2000c).  
Even a reader superficially acquainted with scientific method will likely 
harbour misgivings about Mbeki’s understanding of the scientific process as 
evinced here. Unlike in political negotiations—say, at a peace conference—
scientific consensus is rarely established and opposing schools of thought rare-
ly reconciled via round table discussions where parties either persuade their 
counterparts of the correctness of their view, or find “middle ground” through 
compromise and the reconciliation of competing interests. It is, rather, a gra-
dual multi-year affair normally involving, among other things, a painstaking 
two-step peer review process of the available evidence by the scientific com-
munity; and it does not require acknowledgement of ‘defeat’ or even active 
participation in the process by the author(s) of the relevant theory. For it is in 
the nature of science that the latter will always have the theoretical or metho-
dological wherewithal to avoid such acknowledgement if they wish, for 
example by ‘cherry-picking’ evidence—of which Duesberg and Rasnick have 
been accused; see (Cartwright 2010).  
In fact, since every empirical test of a scientific hypothesis rests on an 
indefinite number of explicit as well as implicit background assumptions, it is 
possible to save any hypothesis—whether that be ‘AIDS is not caused by 
HIV’ or ‘the Earth is flat’—from being falsified by the evidence through judi-
cious adjustment of our assumptions regarding the evidence’s reliability, rele-
vance, etc.; see (Duhem 1906), (Quine 1951). By putting undue emphasis on 
conclusive evidence, or adopting an unreasonably strict standard of proof, it is 
possible to exploit the uncertainty inherent in all scientific knowledge in order 
to irrationally uphold any theory whatsoever. (This is exactly the strategy of 
global warming deniers and the Flat Earth Society). Scientific judgments 
usually are a matter of weighing the balance of probabilities, given the evi-
dence, fairly appraised.   
Of course, there is scope for attempting to read Mbeki charitably. Might 
he not simply be expressing the commonsensical methodological injunction 
that scientific research must remain “open-minded” when looking for a new 
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hypothesis, trying to explain an anomaly, or trying to find a new cure? Moreo-
ver, is not the notion of a dominant school of thought, or paradigm, and its in-
fluence on the form and content of scientific research a staple of all post-Kuh-
nian philosophy of science? And is not gauging the precise extent to which 
subscribers to the dominant paradigm are obliged to engage scientific dissen-
ters—as well as deciding what the tradeoff should be between the costs and 
risks of doing so and the value of epistemic pluralism—a very difficult exer-
cise (Intemann and de Melo-Martín 2014)? Finally, is not the claim that Wes-
tern science as practiced in the 20th and 21st centuries suffers from a democracy 
deficit a mainstay of contemporary sociology of science and science and tech-
nology studies (STS)? In other words, is Mbeki not on to a perfectly reaso-
nable and legitimate criticism of extant HIV/AIDS science?  
The problem is that Mbeki is not merely warning against the danger of 
clinging too strongly, in times of crisis, to an established paradigm; exhorting 
the virtues of epistemic pluralism; or calling for a better integration of science 
into the democratic decision process. Mbeki appears to literally model scienti-
fic dissent on political dissent. In his ‘Letter to World Leaders’, Mbeki at-
tempts to explain the South African position on AIDS to the U.S. and various 
European governments, writing that a country like South Africa that has seen 
the face of tyranny has a moral duty to never allow tyranny to make a come-
back. While the past tyranny was political, the present one in the context of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic is that of a dominant scientific school of thought:  
Not long ago, in our own country, people were killed, tortured, impris-
oned and prohibited from being quoted in private and in public be-
cause the established authority believed that their views were danger-
ous and discredited. We are now being asked to do precisely the same 
thing that the racist apartheid tyranny we opposed did, because, it is 
said, there exists a scientific view that is supported by the majority, 
against which dissent is prohibited. (Mbeki 2000b), made public by 
(Gellman 2000) 
Notice how Mbeki slides here from the oppression of political views to the 
oppression of scientific views. To him, it is ‘precisely the same thing.’ 
The closing lines of (Castro Hlongwane  2002) in fine postcolonialist 
style quote the African-Brazilian Abdias do Nascimento to call on Africans to 
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jettison the dogmas of ‘scientific Eurocentrism’, reject the notion of a ‘defini-
tive, universal truth’, and carve out a space for an African one:  
Black people require a scientific knowledge that allows them to for-
mulate theoretically – in systematic and consistent form – their experi-
ence of almost five centuries of oppression, resistance, and creative 
struggle. […] For centuries we have carried the burden of the crimes 
and falsities of 'scientific' Eurocentrism, its dogmas imposed upon our 
being as the brands of a definitive, 'universal' truth. Against this, we 
have, in struggle, made the statement to which we will remain loyal – 
that we are human and African!’ (Castro Hlongwane  2002: Ch. XV; 
Mbeki’s emphasis).  
In Mbeki’s eyes, therefore, African politicians, far from being well-advised to 
leave science to the scientists, are morally bound to get involved: it would be 
‘a dereliction of duty if we were to say, as far as health issues are concerned, 
we will leave it to doctors and scientists’ (Mbeki 2000c). Mbeki seems gen-
uinely to believe that science and politics are joined at the hip: science is not 
separate and cannot separate itself from the social-political sphere, and the 
truths it delivers cannot and must not be separated from their social-political 
determinants; if one is justified in rejecting those social-political determi-
nants—such as, in the case of “Western” medical science, colonialist and 
Apartheid ideology—then one is justified to reject its truths.  
Thus, Mbeki argues in his Letter that mass distribution of ARVs is not 
an appropriate public health response to the epidemic in Africa, because ’a 
simple superimposition of Western experience on African reality would be ab-
surd and illogical’. The chief difference between ‘Western experience’ and 
‘African reality’ are disparities in HIV/AIDS propagation characteristics: ‘un-
like in the West, AIDS in Africa is heterosexually transmitted, it kills millions 
here whereas it kills thousands there, and deaths are increasing, rather than 
decreasing’ Mbeki 2000b. Another important characteristic Mbeki does not 
mention is HIV prevalence by population group; in South Africa in 2008, it 
was: African 13.6%, Colored 1.7%, White 0.3%, Indian 0.3%, tracking both 
traditional race categories and socio-economic status; see (HSRC 2009). (Fas-
sin 2007) suggests that Mbeki’s intention in his Letter to World Leaders is me-
rely to ‘understand the specificities of the African epidemic and [to] choose 
solutions adapted to that context’ (op.cit.: p. 6). But (Castro Hlongwane  2002) 
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makes it abundantly clear that Mbeki fears that these statistics feed into a ra-
cist narrative of black Africans being selectively decimated by a virus because 
of their sexual and moral depravity, and that this narrative is the very founda-
tion of the “Western” HIV/AIDS hypothesis itself (mirroring early homopho-
bic “explanations” for HIV/AIDS propagation characteristics in the West in 
the 80s and 90s).  If the narrative is wrong, so must be the hypothesis. 10
(Castro Hlongwane  2002) also makes it clear that Mbeki’s rejection of 
the “Western” treatment response to HIV/AIDS cannot not be understood as 
merely an isolated instance of an African leader rejecting a specific recom-
mendation issued by a “Western” science and pharmaceutical industry he per-
ceives as exploitative and racist. The text is permeated with calls for the libe-
ration of Africans from centuries of oppression, for the recovery of their digni-
ty, and their intellectual and psychological emancipation from the [Western] 
’omnipotent apparatus’ (a specious concept Mbeki borrows from (Marcuse 
1955)). In fact, Mbeki around the same period elaborated one of the cultural 
policies he is most known for: his call for an ‘African Renaissance’, a broad 
transformative change that consists, as he put it in an address to a conference 
of African universities, in ‘the economic, social, cultural and political renais-
sance of [the African] continent and in the drive for the development of Indi-
genous Knowledge Systems (IKS)’ (Mbeki 2005).  
A crucial part of the African Renaissance, according to Mbeki, is that 
‘all critical and transformative educators in Africa embrace an indigenous 
African world-view and root their nation’s education paradigms in an indige-
nous socio-cultural and epistemological framework’ (ibid.). African educatio-
nal curricula, in particular, should be indigenous-grounded and orientated, 
Mbeki argues, failing which they would remain alien and irrelevant to African 
society, ‘as is seen to be the case with the legacy of colonial and neo-colonial 
education systems’ (ibid.). The fundamental reorientation required by the Afri-
can renaissance requires, furthermore, that African universities assume ‘[a]n 
 For a good explanation of the African data that is neither absurd and illogical, nor 10
racist, yet perfectly “Western”, see e.g. (Epstein 2007: pp. 49-66); cf. however, (Al-
lais and Venter 2012: pp. 401-404) for an objection to her argument. For a closely 
analogous example by Bruno Latour of ‘excessive distrust of good matters of fact 
disguised as bad ideological biases’ (i.e. global warming denialism in the U.S.), see 
(Latour 2004: p. 227).
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African identity and vision that […] represents a critical point of departure 
from the current colonial-Western identity which is neither suitable nor com-
patible with this identity.’ It should create, in particular, ‘[…] a new paradigm 
that locates the African condition, knowledge, experiences, values, world-view 
and mindset at the centre of our scholarship and knowledge-seeking approach’ 
(ibid.). In other words, Africa needs ‘a distinctively African knowledge sys-
tem’ (ibid.). Mbeki’s call for an African Renaissance was widely acclaimed as 
‘a call for African pride, African sovereignty, a ‘re-birth’ of African self re-
liance’, and has been influential throughout the African continent (Thornton 
2008: p. 132).  
Yet, insofar as it aims to complete the process of decolonisation via the 
rejection of a “Western” epistemological framework, the African Renaissance 
would appear to aim at rehabilitating an African IKS and epistemology that is 
standardly thought to include supernatural and ‘paranormal’ paths to know-
ledge; (Asante 2005: 40), cited in (Horsthemke 2010: 30-31). For, African 
epistemology, according to Asante, comprises special methods of “knowing” 
such as divination and revelation, extrasensory perception, and the communi-
cation with supernatural beings such as spirits and ancestors imparting know-
ledge through ‘mediums, diviners, animals, extraordinary life events, or natu-
ral phenomena’ (ibid.). (Dei 2004) explains that affirming ‘African ways to 
know’ means affirming ‘that personal subjectivity and emotionality must be 
legitimised, [t]hereby asserting that the [Western] subjectivity/objectivity and 
rationality/irrationality splits are false’ (op.cit: p. 340), cited in (Horsthemke 
2010: p. 31). African IKS are not merely claimed to be epistemically legiti-
mate; an outsider’s judgment that the knowledge claims of an IKS are untrue 
or lacking adequate justification is said to constitute ‘epistemic injustice’ and 
to be tantamount to inflicting ‘epistemic harm’ (Horsthemke 2010: p. 30)—
harm of the type historically inflicted by colonial and Apartheid regimes.  
Mbeki’s call for ‘a distinctively African knowledge system’ will resonate 
with readers familiar with postcolonial STS. They will recognise, in particular, 
his criticism of “Western” science’s pretensions to universality, its dominating, 
exploitative, imperialist, and racist character. In STS the “Western” sciences 
have long been viewed as ‘just one kind of culturally specific “ethnoscience” 
among the many that have existed’ (Harding 1992: p. 311), and authors in this 
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field have long called for the development and strengthening for contemporary 
purposes of non-Western scientific traditions that respect the cultural legacies 
of postcolonial societies. The Mbeki of (Castro Hlongwane  2002) and (Ra-
matlhodi 2001) thus would probably find himself well represented by Har-
ding’s description of postcolonial STS as engaged in the criticism of not just 
the technologies, applications, and social institutions of “Western” science, but 
also of its very technical/cognitive core, as harbouring ‘distinctive and unat-
tractive cultural and political commitments’ (ibid.). ‘These critics’, Harding 
writes, ‘are opposed not to science, but to the world-wide dominance of only 
one ethnoscience, and of one that inherently legitimates—perhaps even re-
quires—an imperialism against other scientific traditions, other cultures, other 
peoples and nature itself’ (ibid.) 
Whether and to which extent Mbeki was opposed to “Western” science 
in this way is neither entirely clear, nor uncontroversial, however. Did he real-
ly intend the African Renaissance to lead to the revival and legitimisation—at 
the expense of “Western” science—of an African Epistemology and IKS that 
would include traditional magical thinking and the supernatural? (This is the 
neo-traditionalist or ‘strong Afro-centrist’ interpretation of the African Renais-
sance project). In public, he much more frequently vaunted other expected be-
nefits, such as democratisation, poverty reduction and accelerated economic 
growth through liberal policies such as NEPAD. (This is the ‘modernistic’ in-
terpretation). Moreover, Mbeki generally does not appear to display much 
epistemological suspicion against “Western” science in fields other than medi-
cine, such as economic policy, technology, etc.  According to this line of 11
thought, to explain South Africa’s AIDS policy tragedy we should instead 
single out as the primary factor the personal influence on Mbeki of the (per-
fectly Western) AIDS denialists; see e.g. (Schuklenk 2004), (Weinel 2007). 
AIDS denialism, after all, is a world-wide phenomenon and perhaps South 
Africa’s misfortune was simply to have been saddled with a post-apartheid 
president who happened to get personally sucked into the denialist community, 
as have many others at the time (Nattrass 2011). But this does not explain why 
no other government leaders—who, especially in English speaking countries, 
were equally exposed to public campaigns waged by the ‘dissidents’ in feature 
 As pointed out to me by Nicoli Nattrass (personal communication). 11
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length TV programmes, newspapers articles, websites, etc.—took the bait, 
while Mbeki swallowed it hook, line, and sinker. 
I submit that Mbeki could have fallen for denialism, because his post-
modernist/postcolonialist belief system—among the pillars of which are the 
‘debunking’ of the universalist truth-claims of “Western” science, the denial of 
its presumed monopoly on scientific knowledge production, and the unravel-
ling of its socio-economic, historical, and ideological determinants—predis-
poses to this.  (Mbeki 2005), (Ramatlhodi 2001), and (Castro Hlongwane 12
2002) certainly provide evidence that Mbeki when speaking privately and 
anonymously as well as publicly is very much prone to using the language of 
postmodernism/postcolonialism, e.g. when he expounds his view that a genui-
nely “African” science based on non-Western ideological and cultural deter-
minants should have non-Western scientific content, as well. And he certainly 
uses postmodernist/postcolonialist concepts, such as that of the ‘omnipotent 
apparatus’, to justify his positions. Note, however, that while I wish to claim 
here that postmodernist/postcolonialist theory generally predisposes to denia-
lism, I hesitate to maintain that Thabo Mbeki himself did fall for it because of 
his postmodernism/postcolonialism. To do so would be going beyond the avai-
lable evidence, and in any event, incidental to the philosophical argument to 
be made in the next section.  
To wrap up our South African case study: Mbeki’s desire to free Africa 
from the cultural, political and economic subjugation of the West took in the 
case of the HIV/AIDS epidemic the form of his government merging the 
search for an idiosyncratically African remedy (e.g. the failed miracle cure Vi-
rodene, see Myburgh 2009) with advocacy for African Traditional Medicine, 
and a now infamous public health response that sought to complement ARV 
distribution programs with an emphasis on poverty reduction and improving 
nutrition through garlic, lemon, beetroot, and the South African potato; see 
(Butler 2005), (Thornton 2008: pp. 133-34). Only a Cabinet revolt in 2003—
 As implicitly acknowledged by (Weinel 2007: pp. 757-58); see also (Lodge 2002), 12
(Sheckels 2004). For more on how postmodernism has fuelled various conspiracy 
theories and denials of bona fide scientific facts, see (Latour 2004), and infra.
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brought about in part by successful legal challenges,  political pressure from 13
opposition and civil society groups, international ridicule, and ministers’ gro-
wing concern for damage to the reputation of the country as an investment op-
portunity—followed by Mbeki’s ultimate ouster from office in 2008 allowed 
for a gradual policy reversal and implementation of scaled up ARV distribu-
tion programs.  
In 2012, ARV treatment coverage in South Africa reached 83% under 
WHO 2010 guidelines to provide access to ARVs for every South African citi-
zen with a CD4+ T lymphocyte count of <350 cells/mm3 (UNAIDS 2012). 
AIDS related deaths in South Africa are estimated to have fallen to 194,000 in 
2010 ASSA 2011, and life expectancy for those who do start antiretroviral the-
rapy has returned to near-normal pre HIV/AIDS levels (Johnson, Mossong et 
al. 2013). 
3. “Epistemic charity” and the consequences 
Recent South African history illustrates that it is not without real world 
consequence which philosophy of science health policy makers subscribe to. 
In a paper read to the 20th World Congress of Philosophy, Daniel Dennett ar-
gued that the cluster of theories called ‘postmodernism’ has spawned a meme 
(a replicating idea) that has spread around the world like a virus, with devasta-
ting consequences, in particular for the developing world (Dennett 2000); see 
also (Dennett 1997). The meme in question is the idea that “Western” science 
was a colonial imposition on the developing world, not at all a worthy substi-
tute for the traditional science and the traditional practices and beliefs it at-
tempted to replace. “Western” science, according to this meme, is but one 
among many equally valid narratives, and not to be privileged in its competi-
tion with native traditions (op. cit.: p. 94). This “virus” had dire effects, claims 
Dennett:  
 HIV infection dramatically increases child mortality and is a significant risk factor 13
for cerebral palsy and other debilitating diseases. The Mbeki government refused to 
provide zero positive women in labour with highly effective prophylactic ARV treat-
ment and threatened doctors found administering it with disciplinary action or dis-
missal. It was compelled to relent in 2002 by a high-profile Constitutional Court case, 
which ultimately reduced the mother-to-child transmission rate from up to 35% in 
2000 to less than 4% in 2012, and is saving the lives today of approximately 70000 
children per year; see (de Cock, Fowler et al. 2000).
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[…] it raised infant mortality rates, led to a general decline in the 
health and wellbeing of women and children, and, perhaps worst of all, 
indirectly [strengthened] the hand of the traditional despot who ruled 
the nation (Dennett 2000: p. 93).  
Dennett 2000 does not attempt to substantiate these specific claims, re-
ferring us instead to work in STS by (Nanda 1998), (Afshari 1994), (Okin 
1997), and (Hoodbhoy 1991) (on India, Pakistan, women, and Islam, respecti-
vely). (Nanda 1998), for example, studied popular resistance in 1970s rural 
India to smallpox vaccination campaigns based on the modern cowpox-based 
vaccine. She notes that some Western anthropologists and Indian scientists 
defended the resistance at the time on the grounds that the vaccination cam-
paign amounted to an ‘imposition of “Western logocentric mode of thought”’. 
The latter distinguishes, in a distinctly un-Indian way, between natural and 
supernatural forces and thereby constitutes an affront to the (much more dan-
gerous) local custom of inoculation with human smallpox, ‘accompanied by 
prayers to the goddess of smallpox, Sitala Devi’ (op.cit.: p. 289ff) (Despite 
this, India announced complete eradication of smallpox in 1977, thanks in 
large measure to the cowpox-based vaccine).  
Like Dennett, Nanda notes that there is a cluster of theories of science 
that  
[…] forbids outsiders from evaluating the truth or falsity of any beliefs 
of other people in other cultures from the vantage point of what is sci-
entifically known about the world and, conversely, allows the insiders 
to reject as ethnocentric and imperialistic any truth claim that does not 
use locally accepted metaphysical categories and rules of justification. 
(Nanda 1998: p. 286), see also (Nanda 2003).  
Nanda argues that theories in this cluster effectively dispense a form of epis-
temic charity, an epistemic “gift” given by well-meaning, mostly Western, 
theorists to the formerly oppressed. To be ‘epistemically charitable’ is to hold 
that  
[…] because modern “Western” science is but one among the many 
ways of understanding the world and is as embedded in its own cultur-
al context of production as other knowledges are in theirs, it cannot 
serve as a transculturally valid source of knowledge. All sciences are 
ethnosciences, and none is more universally true than any other. This 
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gift has many names, many givers, and many presumed 
beneficiaries.’ (ibid.)  
The developing world, Nanda suggests, should ‘respectfully return the gift’.  
Nanda's and Dennett’s position may have received support from unex-
pected quarters. The French critical theorist and sociologist of science Bruno 
Latour describes the “terrible irony” that postmodern theory has taught for 
years that  
‘[…] behind the appearance of objective statements hide real preju-
dices, that facts are made up, that there is no such thing as natural, 
unmediated, unbiased access to truth, that we are always prisoners of 
language, that we always speak from a particular standpoint, and so 
on, while dangerous extremists are using the very same argument of 
social construction to destroy hard-won evidence that could save our 
lives.’ (Latour 2004: p. 227).  
The ‘dangerous extremists’ Latour is referring to are conservative U.S. politi-
cians who deny climate change by intentionally exploiting and emphasising 
the lack of absolute scientific certainty for their political goals. Latour also 
mentions the New York 9/11 terror attack conspiracy theorists and those who 
deny that man ever landed on the moon, as being in the same group of people; 
clearly, he could have added AIDS denialists to this list.  
What all these denialisms have in common, according to Latour, is that 
they use exactly the same patterns of argument and explanation: they develop 
a social critique that encourages us to be sceptical of what scientists say, be-
cause they are either dishonest or unaware of their real motives; they then of-
fer an explanation in terms of powerful agents, hidden forces, shady and gree-
dy groups at international pharmaceutical companies, or more generally, socie-
ty, discourse, knowledge/power, capitalism, or colonialist empires (ibid.). Si-
milarly to Dennett, Latour worries that STS theorists, like mad scientists, may 
have let the “virus” of postmodern critique out of their laboratories, and are 
now powerless to do anything to limit its disastrous effects (op.cit.: 
p. 230-231).  14
I will follow Nanda and henceforth refer to those authors and theories of 
science that could fairly be described as ‘epistemically charitable’—or as dis-
 Latour somewhat dials back this criticism in the latter parts of his article.14
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pensing the “gift” of epistemic charity as defined above—collectively as 
‘postmodernist/postcolonialist’ (often abbreviated to ‘postmodernist’). One of 
the postmodernist givers, according to Dennett, is the philosopher Richard 
Rorty (op.cit.: p. 97ff); numerous contemporary sociologists of science, STS 
theorists, anthropologists, postcolonial and critical theorists, probably are as 
well. Thabo Mbeki, insofar as he did not actively participate in the develop-
ment of postmodernist theory or ‘epistemic charity’, but rather used postmo-
dernist arguments to justify his public health policy, would be a beneficiary.  
What philosophical lesson, then, can we learn about postmodernism and 
epistemic charity from the HIV/AIDS tragedy in South Africa? It would be 
tempting to argue as follows: 
(i) Postmodernist critique relativises “Western” science as but one 
among many narratives without epistemic authority over the truth-
claims of “non-Western” sciences and knowledge systems. (Pre-
mise) 
(ii) The one-time President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, was 
prompted by postmodernist critique to doubt the “Western” scien-
tific consensus that HIV causes AIDS and to implement a health 
policy that delayed widespread implementation of ARV-drug dis-
tribution programs to combat HIV. (Premise) 
(iii) The delay in implementation led to the avoidable AIDS deaths of 
hundreds of thousands of people. (Premise) 
(iv) Thabo Mbeki was prompted by postmodernist critique to imple-
ment a health policy that lead to the death of hundreds of thou-
sands of people. (from ii, iii) 
(v) Any theory of science which is apt to contribute to grave real-
world consequences such as these should be rejected. (Premise) 
(vi) Postmodernist critique of “Western” science is such a theory. 
(from i, ii, iii) 
(vii) Therefore, postmodernist critique of “Western” science should be 
rejected. (from v, vi) 
But there are several obvious problems with this. First, premise (ii) has 
been motivated in Section 2, but certainly not conclusively established. The 
argument is only as likely to be sound as the empirical claim in (ii) is likely to 
be true. Worse, if its intended upshot is the falsity of postmodernist critique of 
science, then it amounts to an argument from adverse consequences, which is 
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logically invalid: “If postmodernist critique is true (or believed to be true), 
then consequence X ensues. X is morally undesirable. Therefore, postmoder-
nist critique is false” is a non sequitur. (Maffie 2005: p. 69-70) attributes a fal-
lacy of precisely this kind to Nanda. Of course, technically postmodernism’s 
falsity is not the intended upshot of the argument, since the conclusion states 
simply that postmodernist critique of science ought to be rejected, which we 
can interpret as meaning that it should not be endorsed, publicly approved, or 
supported. (A suppressed premise here being that outcomes such as preven-
table deaths are undesirable for moral reasons, and that anything, including 
endorsement of a theory, that contributes to such outcomes ought to be avoi-
ded for those moral reasons). Note that arguments from consequences of this 
or a similar kind do have a standard use in pragmatics, ethics, and public poli-
cy. Moreover, since the relation between the theory and the outcomes may 
have been unforeseen and certainly unintended, the argument would not li-
cense moral judgement of the author(s) of postmodernism; cf. (Maffie 2005).  
Even so, there is something unsatisfactory about the dialectical situation 
created by such an argument. (Edwards, Ashmore et al. 1995) note that argu-
ments against epistemological relativism often involve either furniture (as in: 
“but, surely, this table is real?”), or death (as in: “relativism actually produces 
death and misery, genocide, poverty,” etc.). The general form of ‘bottom line’ 
arguments like the above is always the same, they say: there is a reality which 
relativists deny, and by denying it, refuse to oppose, which will ultimately as-
sert itself in an act of terror or poetic justice—i.e. it will kill us for our (alle-
gedly) false representations of the world (op. cit.: p. 34). Edwards et al. think 
that it is easy to turn the tables on this kind of argument. For the idea that only 
realist, i.e. non-relativist, thought can ‘bar the gate to the polis and keep the 
night, the jungle and the jackals at bay’, (Smith 1988: p. 154), cited in (Ed-
wards, Ashmore et al. 1995: p. 33), is mistaken. Death and misery, genocide, 
poverty, happen anyway—and they certainly have happened during the period 
of realism’s dominance when science was complicit with colonialism, impe-
rialism, racism, sexism, homophobia, etc. As they put it, realism is 
[…] no more secure than relativism in making sure the good guys win, 
nor even of defining who the good guys are […]. Realists cannot claim 
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the political and moral high ground. (Edwards, Ashmore et al. 1995: 
p. 35). 
Their objection, then, is a tu quoque: “Modernism kills, too..!” Indeed, 
an important theoretical aim of STS and postcolonial studies in the 20th centu-
ry has been to uncover and document the many harms caused by “Western” 
science’s universalist pretensions, its historical complicity with and active 
contribution to imperialism, racism, sexism, homophobia, and other ills. But tu 
quoque rejoinders are of course fallacies, too: even if it can be shown that 
‘realist’ theories of science have also had negative real-life effects on the deve-
loping world, women, black people, and other marginalised groups, then this 
would still be irrelevant for the point I have made about the connection bet-
ween postmodernist critique of science, Thabo Mbeki’s AIDS denialism, and 
the South African humanitarian catastrophe. Moreover, while the tu quoque 
objection counters one argument from consequences with another, it fails to 
account for the intuition that there is a difference between the use for morally 
questionable aims of a true theory (e.g. when parts of “Western” science are 
co-opted for the aims of empire, capital, patriarchy, etc.), and the use for mo-
rally unquestionable aims of a false theory (as, presumably, in the case of 
Mbeki’s embrace of denialism in the aim of furthering public health and Afri-
can nation building). For one, the adverse consequences in each case are po-
tentially of a different kind, which we could chalk up to the immoral nature of 
the aims in the former case, and to the falsity of the theory in the latter.  
Precisely assessing the force and limits of arguments from adverse 
consequences is certainly difficult. (Jansen 2007) suggests that arguments 
from consequences are not clearly distinguishable from what she calls a ‘weak 
reductio ad absurdum’. ‘Strong reductios' are arguments of the form ‘If X, 
then Y. Y is absurd. Therefore, not-X’, where Y is thought to be absurd be-
cause it is either internally inconsistent, or inconsistent with X. A weak reduc-
tio, by contrast, appeals merely to the strong implausibility of the consequent 
of the conditional premise; for different nomenclatures, see (Kneale and 
Kneale 1962: p. 9) and (Rescher 2005), cited in (Jansen 2007: p. 252). A weak 
reductio is thus only as strong as the perceived degree of implausibility, and 
according to Jansen it is not clearly distinguishable from arguments from ad-
verse consequences: like the latter, a weak reductio can express causal rela-
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tionships and have normative conclusions, i.e. it can appeal to consequences 
that contradict generally held opinions about values and norms, and that as a 
result are perceived as “absurd”, because they are extremely undesirable (op. 
cit.: p. 259). Thus, we might say that (i)-(vii) is actually a weak reductio: it 
depicts consequences (avoidable deaths) that are not just undesirable, but ab-
surdly so (ibid.). 
While interpreting (i)-(vii) in the above way as a weak reductio might 
allow us to draw a somewhat mitigated conclusion regarding the truth of 
postmodernist critique of science, another form of argument suggests itself 
that avoids overselling the conclusion, eschews difficult to establish claims 
about Thabo Mbeki’s thought processes, and preempts the tu quoque response 
of the postmodernists, as follows: 
(1) Postmodernist critique relativises “Western” science as one among 
many narratives without epistemic authority over the truth-claims 
of “non-Western” sciences and knowledge systems. (Premise) 
(2) Postmodernist critique* does not relativise “Western” science as 
one among many narratives without epistemic authority over the 
truth-claims of “non-Western” sciences and knowledge systems. 
(Premise) 
(3) The President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, doubted the “Wes-
tern” scientific consensus view that ARV-drugs are effective in 
combating HIV/AIDS, and implemented a health policy that de-
layed widespread distribution of ARVs. (Premise) 
(4) The delay in distribution of ARV-drugs led to the avoidable AIDS 
deaths of hundreds of thousands of people. (Premise) 
(5) In virtue of the fact that postmodernist critique relativises “Wes-
tern” science, it could naturally be appealed to in justifying a 
health policy response that led to an avoidable humanitarian catas-
trophe  (from 1, 3, 4) 
(6) In virtue of the fact that postmodernist critique* does not relativise 
“Western” science, it could not easily be appealed to in justifying a 
health policy response that led to an avoidable humanitarian catas-
trophe (from 2, 3, 4) 
(7) (5) and (6) provide a strong reason for preferring postmodernist 
critique* over postmodernist critique. (Premise) 
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(8) Therefore, postmodernist critique* should be preferred over post-
modernist critique. (from 7)  15
Here, (3) can easily be textually corroborated. (4), similarly, is a scienti-
fically well-established fact, whereas premises (1) and (2), while definitional 
can be shown to be satisfied by various accounts of science in STS and 
contemporary sociology of science; see (Koertge 1998). (5), independently 
plausible as it is, has been illustrated in Section 2 by means of Mbeki’s private 
and anonymous writings, as well as being endorsed by Dennett, Nanda, and 
Latour. A further advantage of the argument is that it avoids a shoot-out with 
Edwards et al. over which philosophy of science historically has more blood 
on its hands. For to the extent that (7) is true and independently of what else is 
true, it undoubtedly provides pragmatic grounds for shunning postmodernist 
critique, and the genocidal dimensions of the health crisis suggest that these 
grounds are very strong. Moreover, since the argument contrasts a brand of 
postmodernist theory that relativises “Western” science and that can and has 
been used to justify misguided public policy, with an unspecified alternative 
which does not, it simply calls for a non-relativist alternative to mainstream 
postmodernist theory that cannot be so used—not necessarily for a a return to 
modernism. This alternative non-relativist philosophers have so far been slow 
to provide.  
This is not to say that attempts are not afoot. Harry Collins, Robert 
Evans, and Martin Weinel from the University of Cardiff, for example, are cal-
ling for a ‘Third Wave’ in STS, inaugurated by what they call ‘Studies of Ex-
pertise and Experience’; see (Collins and Evans 2007), (Collins 2007), (Col-
lins, Weinel et al. 2010). This new type of STS would, on the one hand, safe-
guard the presumptive theoretical and epistemic advances made by social 
constructivism and 20th century sociology of science—namely the discovery 
that, as Latour put it so succinctly, ‘prejudices hide behind apparently objec-
tive statements, that facts are made up, that there is no such thing as unmedia-
ted access to truth, that we always speak from a particular standpoint’; and on 
the other hand, it would recognise that the democratisation of technical deci-
 My thanks go to Mikkel Gerken who first suggested a comparative form of the ar15 -
gument to me.
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sion-making processes does not, as many postmodernists/postcolonialists ap-
pear naively to believe, always lead to more socially and morally desirable 
outcomes.  
A key notion of Third Wave Science Studies so defined is the notion of 
‘expertise’. Collins and Evans propose a classification of expertise into five 
different types, whereby Mbeki would only have had an intermediary kind of 
expertise, ’primary source knowledge’ (PSK), the highest form being ‘interac-
tional/contributory expertise’; (Collins and Evans 2007: p. 14), (Weinel 2007: 
p. 755). PSK does not involve specialist knowledge, whether tacitly or expli-
citly, and can be acquired by merely reading published scientific papers wi-
thout any social or professional contact with interactional/contributory experts 
in a particular field. (Weinel 2007: p. 758) argues that because Mbeki did not 
have the highest form of expertise, he ought to have given special weight to 
the advice of genuine interactional/contributory experts—such as Makgoba or 
Luc Montagnier, co-discoverer of HIV and member of the Presidential Advi-
sory board—in respect of the technical dimensions of HIV/AIDS health poli-
cy. While the conclusion may be correct, Weinel unfortunately fails to address 
the obvious retort that Mbeki did appear to have given “special weight” to the 
advice of genuine interactional/contributory experts. But, tragically, they were 
the wrong ones (namely, Duesberg and Rasnick).  
(Jones 2002), who studies precisely the question ‘Which scientists 
should we trust?’ argues that a representative of the scientific consensus is, 
ceteris paribus, less likely to take an epistemically biased stance on a particu-
lar scientific question, than a scientific dissident. Therefore policy makers—
who are unable to evaluate the issues themselves, because they lack sufficient 
expertise—need to make a bet on the dominant scientific community being 
right rather than the dissidents. Jones’ reasons for believing that a theory ac-
cepted by the majority of the scientific community is less likely to be biased 
are that (a) the scientific community considers scientific claims solely based 
on their evidence (in other words, the publicly endorsed considerations in fa-
vour of acceptance of a scientific claim are always exclusively epistemic, or 
truth-seeking); and (b) communal acceptance of a claim is always dependent 
on the absence of counter-evidence, and on no counter-claims being made in 
the community.  Thus, Jones suggests that the discursive and public nature of 
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science ensures that scientific beliefs are both ‘evidence-determined’ and ‘evi-
dence-sensitive’; and that scientific consensus represents our best bulwark 
against epistemic bias, and our best chance for gaining the truth about a mat-
ter. By contrast, we cannot be as assured, in principle, that an individual dis-
sident scientists’ acceptance of a theory is equally truth-oriented, and that his/
her epistemic commitments are not the result of personal bias (Jones 2002: 
p. 520). 
While admirable in its intent and, possibly, as a normative ideal for the 
collective practice of science, a weakness of the argument in (Jones 2002) is 
that it does not provide a justification for Jones’ apparent confidence in the 
non-existence or irrelevance of inter-subjective and community-wide causes of 
epistemic bias. As such, his analysis appears to disregard 40 years’ worth of 
work in STS and the sociology of science. Some of a scientist’s motivations 
and reasons for theory acceptance can be systemic and institutional, and yet 
quite opaque to him/herself as well as to the entire community of which she is 
a member. How else to explain past scientific theories that are blatantly biased 
and yet once enjoyed community-wide acceptance? One of the signature 
claims of, say, Sandra Harding’s ‘Standpoint Epistemology’ is precisely that 
marginalised outsiders can occupy epistemically privileged positions, because 
they do not share the dominant scientific community’s ideological, political 
and moral beliefs and value system. Be that as it may, (Jones 2002)’s analysis 
fails to provide us with the tools for understanding Mbeki’s choice to lend his 
ear to one set of scientific experts, who defended a position ostensibly more 
congenial to his political and ideological outlook, rather than to another. 
Collins, Evans, and Weinel’s work appears promising due to its admis-
sion that in modern democratic societies the public and its representatives 
must, after all, allow science—more precisely, the right kind of scientific ex-
pert—special epistemic authority with respect to certain questions. It certainly 
has considerably rocked the boat in STS, going against the grain of much of 
the relativist science ‘debunking’ literature of the 1980s and 90s. Collins, 
Evans, and Weinel recognise that scientific values and a special epistemic sta-
tus accorded to subject experts must be a key part of a democratic cum scienti-
fic society; they call this position ‘elective modernism’. Their theory of exper-
tise is detailed and prima facie quite powerful—the conjunction of their’s and 
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Jones’ criterion certainly seems to rule out AIDS denialists as acceptable 
sources of epistemic authority in the South African Case. Yet, Studies in Ex-
pertise and Experience are still a new field, and even though it is highly plau-
sible that there are indeed distinct levels of expertise, I am not convinced the 
case has been successfully made that it is possible to make the correct qualita-
tive judgments regarding expertise without availing oneself of the one catego-
ry or scientific value that even Collins and Evans do not want to talk about: 
truth.  
What makes someone a top-level expert is not just that they make 
contributions in their field, have interactional/contributory as well as social 
relationships with a group of other such experts, and participate in this group’s 
practices (Collins and Evans 2007). A top-level expert also knows certain cen-
tral truths about the relevant field, or perhaps more truths than a non-expert or 
lower-level expert. For a person who knows few such truths or no truths at all 
about X could hardly appropriately be called an ‘expert’ about X, even though 
she might de facto be referred to as such in various social or historical 
contexts. Even an entire group of such people would still not be proper ex-
perts, although they might interact and engage in different manners of expert-
like practices. Renaissance doctors, for instance, despite being considered and 
referred to as medical “experts” during their time and engaging in expert-like 
behaviour, were not, simply in virtue of having too many false beliefs about 
the human organism. Finally, a person who knows significantly more central 
truths about X than another would have reason to call herself a better expert 
on this ground alone. (There are, of course, further factors in expertise, such as 
tacit knowledge and skill).  
Given the central role Third Wave Science Studies attribute to experts in 
a democratic society, this is not merely a Humpty-Dumpty type of disagree-
ment regarding the correct meaning of the word ‘expert’. An account such as 
that offered by Collins and Evans still seems to offer too few epistemic 
constraints on expertise to be recognisably non-relativist, or truth-centred. In-
sofar as this is the case, their ’elective modernism’ threatens to collapse back 
into familiar postmodernism; and the alternative ‘postmodernist critique*’ to 
continue to elude us.  
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Conclusion 
South Africa continues to carry an extremely high disease burden and at 
the time of writing is still home to approximately 6 million people living with 
HIV/AIDS. While the likely causes for this debacle are many, health policy 
failure is undoubtedly one of them. President Thabo Mbeki’s near-inexplicable 
resistance in the 1999-2003 period to ARV drug distribution programmes as 
recommended to him by WHO, UNAIDS, and most local South African medi-
cal experts, black and white, has been the object of many theories and expla-
natory sketches. Many of these appeal to history, identity, politics, ideology, 
and personal psychology. Gevisser’s excellent biography is especially compel-
ling when it describes Mbeki as “the National Interferer”, a man displaying the 
character trait of a certain frustration at the incompetence of his comrades 
coupled with the self-confidence of being assured of his own competence, and 
the belief that ‘if you want something done, you have to do it yourself’ (Ge-
visser 2007: p. 426). Other works in the nascent genre of Mbeki hermeneutics 
offer similarly interesting insights into the South African HIV/AIDS mystery.  
Yet, all of these explanations must remain partial, I have argued, without 
the recognition that Mbeki’s views on HIV/AIDS presuppose a philosophy of 
science that erases the line separating the political from the scientific. The fe-
minist philosopher of science Helen Longino wrote that a feminist science and 
epistemology requires scientists consciously to choose those background as-
sumptions and explanatory models that are congruent with their political va-
lues; and that feminist scientific practice ‘admits political considerations as 
relevant constraints on reasoning, which through their influence on reasoning 
and interpretation shape content’, the ultimate goal being to ‘prevent the era-
sure from inquiry of a gradient of power that keeps women in a position of 
subordination’ (Longino 1994: p. 481). Exactly the same can be said, mutatis 
mutandis, of postcolonial philosophy of science, and of Mbeki’s conscious 
choice of an explanatory model of the HIV/AIDS epidemic that accommo-
dates his political values as head of the new South African state and the goals 
of the African Renaissance.  
I thus advanced a first argument that lays the blame for the health crisis 
at the feet of postmodernist/postcolonialist doubt about “Western” science, via 
the premise that it was this doubt that moved Mbeki to implement a health po-
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licy that dragged its feet on roll-out of antiretroviral therapy; and I concluded 
that postmodernist critique of “Western” science ought to be shunned. But 
while plausible given the textual evidence, it is difficult to conclusively esta-
blish the premise, and the truth-relevance of the conclusion depends on one’s 
view on the dialectic force of ‘weak’ reductios ad absurdum. Yet, truth—in 
our case, the truth that HIV causes AIDS—still matters. Postmodern anthropo-
logists, social epistemologists, and critical theorists may have shown that 
much harm has been done to society in general, and to colonial societies and 
developing countries in particular, in the name of presumptive scientific 
‘Truth’. Nevertheless, we cannot but espouse as a normative ideal the belief 
that at least some of our scientific beliefs, if formed in the light of the best 
available evidence, reason, and argument, are capable of truth. And we must 
acknowledge that the capacity to judge what constitutes the best available 
scientific evidence is neither evenly distributed nor possessed by democratic 
decision makers, nor even by democratically constituted decision making bo-
dies. It resides, rather, with experts, and the right kind of experts at that. While 
these conclusions are unpalatable to many, there is no alternative; or, more ac-
curately, recent South African history has shown that they are more palatable 
than the alternative.   
This was the guiding thought of the second argument: faced with a situa-
tion where we know that a misguided health policy has lead to a humanitarian 
catastrophe, and where postmodernist critique of “Western” science can and 
has been used to justify this policy, an argument can be made for the preferabi-
lity of another philosophy of science on which this justification would not 
have been possible. Death, in medicine, is the kind of epistemic litmus test the 
existence of which relativists wish to deny: provided other possible causes 
have been ruled out with sufficient probability, the fact that a given treatment 
led to a patient’s death is enormously good reason to believe not only that the 
treatment itself is inadequate, but also that the theory used to justify the treat-
ment is probably false. Analogously, the fact that Mbeki’s “treatment” led to 
the avoidable death of hundreds of thousands is enormously good reason to 
believe not only that it is inadequate, but also that the postmodernist/postcolo-
nialist theory of science he used to justify it is probably false. At the very least, 
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and this was the crux, we have enormously good reason to prefer an alterna-
tive theory on which this treatment could not be justified.  
I closed the paper with the suggestion that it is time for a non-relativist 
alternative to 20th-century STS, sociology, and postmodernist theory of 
science. But while recent Studies of Expertise appear promising, it is unlikely 
that they can deliver it without an epistemology that first returns to its givers 
their “gift” of epistemic charity. 
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